This article reexamines some important issues raised by Greenwald, Pratkanis, Leippe, and Baumgardner (1986) conceming the nature oftheory and its role in research progress, practical applications of psychological knowledge, strategies for develqing and evaluating theories, and relations between empirical and theoretical psychology. I argue that Greenwald et al.'s result+entered methods will not solve problems such as confirmation bias and irreplicability and will aggravate other existing problems: lack of viable theory, fragmentation of the field, mechanical fact gathering, limited applicability of psychological knowledge, and noncumulative develryment of facts, with needless duplication ofresults and reinvention ofempirical constructs. I conclude that all ofthese problems are best solved by establishing a balance between the "rational" and "empirical" epistemologies in psychology.
cqright reE8 by the Amqim ***,ffi9_'d;:SA{ffdJi"j approach ofthe rational epistemology is to develop theories that explain available facts, facilitate practical applications, and predict new facts for future test. This "surface definition" ofapproaches is deceptive, howeve4 because ofhidden differences in how the two epistemologies interpret seemingly straightforward conc€pts such as "practical application," "fact," and "theory."
Facts Under the Two Epistemologies
Under the empirical epistemology, facts are interesting in and of themselves, whereas under the rational epistemology, theories determine how interesting a fact is: Findings are especially interesting when they fail to fit a well-established theory, or when they fit a newly proposed theory and most spectacularly, both. Indeed, observations often do not count as scientific facts until a plausible theoretical mechanism for explaining them is proposed. For example, science at large refused to consider the large body ofwell-known observations on selective breeding as scientific fact until Darwin proposed a plausible theory for explaining these observations. Similarly, extrasensory perception currently falls outside the realm ofpsychological fact not necessarily because researchers on psychic phenomena are "ego-involved theory advocates" (as GPL&B suggest, p.222), but because no plausible theoretical mechanism has been proposed for explaining the data that have been reported.
Theory Under the Empirical Epistemology
The empirical epistemology defines theories broadly and always in relation to operations: In GPL&B (p. 217) , theories (conceptual statements) contrast with operations (specific procedures for fabricating or measuring events) but are related to qerations via an "abstractness" gradient; theories vary from very abstract or removed from specific operations (e.g., "Reward contingent on a respons€ increases the probability of a response," p. 2 I 7) to less theoretical (e.g., "Presentation offood to a pigeon after its depression of a key increases the rate of depression of the key," p. 217).The factthat the "highly theoret-559 ical" version of this key example is vague or inaccurate when compared with the "less theoretical" version is curious (surely "probability per unit time" was meant, p.217), but may stem from the empirical epistemology underlying GPL&B's ideas.
GPL&B's view of theory is @en to two criticisms. First, concepts and operations are virtually impossible to separate: Even simple operations such as counting require conceptual classifrcation. As Gaukroger (1978, p. Underwood, 1957, pp. 175-180) , but as GPL&B (p. 217) pointed out, we should choose our terms so as to minimize confusion wherever possible. The remainder of the present article therefore adopts the more specific terms empirical generalization, hypothesis, unique observation, guiding idea, opinion, theory and theoretical terms, followed in parentheses with the relevant page number for GPL&B's use of the lerm theory. For example, when GPL&B claim on page 2 26 that theory testing should "often be displaced from its status as a central goal of research," they clearly mean the testing ofempirical hypotheses as described in the section of McGuire's (1983) article entitled "Corrupting Effects ofthe Hypothesis Testing Method." Similarly, when GPL&B complained (p . 221) thatliterature reviews often exhibit "theory-predicted bias" by selectively omitting experimental findings contrary to some "thesis,"
"theory" refers to a unique and in principle irreplicable event, their own failure earlier in the article to cite findings contrary to the GPI^&B (p. 222) claimed that some topics (subliminal influence, biorhythms, speed reading, lie detection), and some procedures (for weight control, anxiety reduction, pain relief) are being "researched almost exclusively by advocates who are grinding theoretical axes." As a veteran researcher into subliminal influence (MacKay, 1973) , the oldest and most extensively studied of these topics (see Klein, 1977) ,1 can say that these areas have yet to develop and accept theoretical terms (under a rationalist definition oftheory), and that ifaxes are being ground, they are empirical axes rather than theoretical ones. Moreover, recent reviews suggest that, contrary to GPL&B's claim, as many empirical axes are being ground against subliminal influence as for it (see e.g., Holender, 1986; Morton, 1986 Hempel, 1966) to a small number of conceptually simple theoretical constructs such as nodes (MacKay, 1982 (MacKay, , 1987 and hidden units (McClelland, ceives ples. The hypothetical ground is that it is difficult to imagine how well-established scientific theories could have originated solely as a result of collecting more and more data, no matter how precise, extensive, or qualified the data are. Consider for example the observation that uranium is yellow whereas hydrogen is a colorless gas: It is difficult to imagine how specifuing the conditions under which these observations hold or do not hold could lead in principle to the theoretical concepts that uranium atoms have about 238 electrons, whereas hydrogen atoms have only 1. The historical ground is that such theoretical concepts did not originate in this way whatever it is imagined to be. In the actual history ofscience, theorists often develop highly successful theoretical constructs, such as atoms and sound waves, long before any experimental data whatsoever have accumulated (see Holland et a1., 1986) . Rational epistemology theories originate as inventions, products ofcognition rather than observation. Carnap (1966, p. 230) provided an early summary of this view: "We observe stones and trees and flowers, noting various regularities and describing them by empirical laws. But no matter how long or how carefully we observe such things, we never reach a point at which we observe a molecule or an electron. The term mol ecule tever arises as a result of observations. Forthis reason, no amount ofgeneralization from observations will ever produce a theory ofmolecular processes. Such a theory must arise in another way." Rational epistemology theories cannot originate in the way that GPL&B (p. 226) recommended, by determining the potentially infinite set of conditions under which experimental findings hold or do not hold.
Practical Applications Under the Two Epistemologies
Both epistemologies express concern over the relative inapplicability of current psychological knowledge (see MacKay, 1988 Quine, 1960; Duhem, 1953 Grossberg, 1982 with rather than promoted development of theories for integrating available knowledge (see Baddeley & Wilkins, 1984) and has splintered the field into progressively more narrow and diverging pockets ofinterest, a fragmentation process that could go on indefinitely because procedural variations are unlimited in number.
A second historical battle revolved around the idea that theories "can obstruct research progress" (GPL&B, p.217). Unrep licable introspective reports often seemed suspi ciously similar to the conceptual bias (theory) of the lab from which they emanated, leading to harsh and heated accusations of confirmation bias. The behaviorist remedy for this (alleged) problem was strikingly similar to GPL&B's (p. 217) call for more operational and less "theoretical" descriptions of empirical events and hypothetical constructs: Leading behaviorists mounted an attack not just against introspective methods but against the goal of developing a theory of mental events (see Gardner, 1985) . Under the behaviorist stricture, the theoretical domain ofpsychology was to be limited to observables (external operations, stimuli, and behavior). Blumenthal, 1985; Tirlving, 1979) have complained that this "dreary" projection (GPL&B, p. 225) for result-centered methods ("an accumulation of increasingly precise results limited to ever shrinking domains") is already with us and is not cumulative: Our ability to gather facts has outstripped our ability to remember and use these facts, and old experiments and concepts are being forgotten and reduplicated out of ignorance (Cole & Rudnicky, 1983) Brandt, 1984 Gardner, 1985, p. 136) required to develop and test a theory. Theory construction in psychology eventually will become so time consuming that no single individual will be able to work on the entire theory, let alone conduct experiments as well, so that collaborative groups composed of theorists and experimenters will become commonplace. More interestingly, the social pressures of such collaborative teamwork can be expected to further reduce the viability of GPL&B's "Abandon Prob- lem" option, and its companion, confirmation bias.
